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CASE COMMENTS

ESCHEAT: LAST KNOWN RESIDENCE OF THE CREDITOR
DETERMINES WHICH STATE MAY ESCHEAT
ABANDONED INTANGIBLE PROPERTY
Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965)
The State of Texas, invoking the original jurisdiction of the
United States Supreme Court,' brought an action against the States
of New Jersey and Pennsylvania and the Sun Oil Company to determine which state had jurisdiction to escheat $26,461.65 in abandoned intangible personal property. 2 This property had been owed
by the Sun Oil Company to approximately 1,730 small creditors in
over fifteen states for periods ranging from seven to forty years. Florida was permitted to intervene 3 because it claimed the right to
escheat obligations owed to creditors whose last known residence was
in Florida. Adopting the Florida position the Supreme Court HELD,
that intangibles may only be escheated by the state of the creditor's
last known address as shown by the debtor's books and records, except when there is no last known address or if such address is in a
state that does not provide for the escheat of such property. In such
a case the state of the corporate debtor's domicile is the only state that
4
may escheat. Justice Stewart dissenting.
The problem of sequestering intangible property with multi-state
connections was first presented to the Supreme Court in Connecticut
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Moore.5 The Court upheld New York's
right to unclaimed insurance obligations issued to New York residents
and payable to New York beneficiaries by nonresident life insurance
companies. The Court avoided deciding whether New York's claim
to the property would be superior to any claim for the same property
by another state. It further failed to answer whether New York's
right would be affected should the insured or the beneficiary move
from New York before maturity. Later in Standard Oil Co. v. New
Jersey6 the escheat of the abandoned intangibles of a domestic corporation having only minimal contacts within the state was allowed.
The Supreme Court indicated by way of dictum that full faith and
1.

U.S. CONsT. art.

1II,

§2.

2. This sum is composed of three types of intangibles: (1) debts for which
checks were issued but which were never delivered to the payee and were returned
to the company; (2) debts for which checks were issued that were not returned to
the company or presented for payment; (3) debts reflected on the records of the

company for which checks have not been issued.
3. Order, 373 U.S. 948 (1963).
4. Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 -... (1965).
5. 333 U.S. 541 (1948).
6. 341 U.S. 428 (1951).
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credit would apply, thus barring the possibility of Standard Oil having to pay the claim to more than one state.7 Subsequently, in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania,8 the Court rejected the full
faith and credit argument declaring that any double liability would
deny the debtor due process of law because Pennsylvania has no way
to obtain jurisdiction over other states claiming the same property.
Any states that were not parties to the suit could not be bound by
the Pennsylvania decision, therefore, states should seek the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.9
The principal case is the first to arise after the Western Union decision and the Court was faced squarely with the issue of conflicting
claims by several states. The State of Texas urged that because the
debt was on the books of a Sun Oil Company office in Texas and the
claims had originated there, it had the most significant contacts with
the debt and should be allowed to escheat every item involved. 10 The
Court states that because such a solution would require a case-by-case
determination it would only add turmoil to a question that requires
a clear rule applicable in every situation.New Jersey argued that it should have the exclusive right to escheat the abandoned property since the Sun Oil Company was incorporated in that state. While the Court agreed that this would be
a simple rule to apply, it nevertheless indicated that incorporation was
too minor a factor when extensive multi-state activities were in2
volved.1
Pennsylvania claimed a superior right to the funds arguing that
its laws and economy had contributed most to the prosperity of Sun
Oil Company because Sun's principal place of business was in that
state. In rejecting this argument the Supreme Court recognized the
uncertainty of locating the principal place of business of large diverse
corporations. Also, the Court reasoned that to allow Pennsylvania
to prevail would be tantamount to changing a liability on the books
3
of the company into an asset when the state decides to escheat.1
Finally, the State of Florida contended that because all intangible
property results from a debtor-creditor relation and it is the right of
7.

Id. at

442-43.

8. 368 US. 71 (1961).

9. Id. at 77-80.
10. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948); Security
Say. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923); Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.
2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279
(1963); Griffith v. United Air Lines Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); REsrATEMENT

(SEcoND), CONFLicr OF LAWS §379 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).

11. Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U. S. 674, 12. Id. at .
13.

(1956).

id at__
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the creditor to receive payment of the debt, the debt is property only
to the creditor. The debtor has no proprietary interest in the
property owed.14 Furthermore, a state may only escheat property located within its borders. Thus, while the abandoned intangible property has no physical location in any state it is nonetheless real and
has a location or situs as does other property. 15 Consequently, Florida
urged that only the state of the residence of the creditor would have
jurisdiction over the intangible property for purposes of escheat.16
In accepting the rule proposed by Florida, the Court has successfully
limited the right to escheat abandoned intangible property to only
one state in every situation. By determining the last known residence
from the debtor's books and records it has provided a readily accessible
method for applying the rule.
The Court had previously expressed in Severnoe Securities Corp.
v. London & Lancashire Insurance Co.'1 that the situs or location of
intangible property is not the same for all purposes. Its situs is
controlled by "a common sense appraisal of the requirements of justice and convenience in particular conditions."18 For example, the
Supreme Court has held that negotiable bonds and certificates of
indebtedness issued by one state have their situs for inheritance tax
purposes in the domicile of the deceased owner and not in the issuing
state. 9 The instant case presented a question whether the ease and
uniformity of a rule allowing the debtor state to prevail outweighed
the strong equities in favor of the states in which the creditors resided
until their death or disappearance. It was apparent that the prior
holdings in Standard Oil and Connecticut Mutual were no longer
satisfactory. The ever-increasing mobility of the population and the
growing number of multi-state corporations called for a reappraisal
in this area. An equally important consideration was the enactment
14. Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 592 (1930); Blodgett v. Silberman, 277
U.S. 1,15 (1928); Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors for
the Parish of Orleans, 221 U.S. 346 (1911).
15. Severnoe Sec. Corp. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 120, 123,
174 N.E. 299, 300 (1931).

16. Brief for Florida as Intervenor, pp. 10-15, Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S.
674 (1965).
17. 255 N.Y. 120, 174 N.E. 299 (1931).
18. Id. at 123-24, 174 N.E. at 300.
19. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930); see also Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586 (1930) (in which an Illinois resident, dying there,
left credits for cash deposited in Missouri banks, coupon bonds of the United
States, and promissory notes, all physically within Missouri, but the Court held
that only Illinois could place an inheritance tax upon such intangible property);
Rogers v. Hennepin County, 240 U.S. 184 (1916) (for the purpose of a state tax
on the membership in a grain exchange, the Court held that the situs of the
membership for such purpose was within the state where the exchange was located).
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of escheat statutes by a large number of states covering abandoned
intangible property. It had become obvious that without an adequate
legislative or judicial ruling the courts would be filled with many
states claiming the same intangible property under various local
escheat statutes.
The total effect of the rule in Texas v. New Jersey is impossible to
assess at this time, but the various escheat statutes will play an important part in its administration. While the rule provides many
necessary answers it fails to provide for the administration among
20
the states. The Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act
21
would settle this problem if enacted by all the states. The key to
the act is section 10, which provides that when abandoned intangible
property held in one state is owed to an owner whose last known address is in another state, such property will not be escheated by the
debtor's state, but will be delivered to the creditor's state if that state
has provisions for the escheat of the property owed and also has a
similar reciprocal provision.22 It is interesting to note that the Uniform Act provides for a custodial proceeding rather than an escheat
proceeding. By this it is meant that the state seeks only to gain
possession of the property and not title. While it is not expected
that many rightful claims will be made after the state has possession,
23
the funds will always be available to the rightful owners.
To simplify administration within the state, persons are compelled
to report and deliver abandoned property to the appropriate state
officer who will distribute the property according to the provisions
of the act. 24 Should a person fail to comply, the state may examine
20
his records 25 and compel delivery along with imposing a penalty.
In the absence of individual initiative by all the states to adopt
the Uniform Act or a similar one, it would be advisable for Congress

9A UNIFORM LAWs ANN. 253 (1955) [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM AcT].
21. Florida is among a slowly expanding minority of eleven states that have
enacted the UNIFOni Acr with only minor variations. Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§44-351 to -378 (1956); CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE ANN. §§1500-27; FLA. STAT.
§§717.01-.30 (1963); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§14-501 to -532 (Supp. 1963); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 141, §§101-30 (Smith-Hurd 1964); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§67-2201 to
-2230 (Supp. 1963); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§22-22-1 to -29 (Supp. 1963); ORE. REv.
STAT. §§98.302-.436 (1963); UTAH CODE ANN. §§78-44-1 to -28 (Supp. 1963); VA.
CODE ANN. §55-210.1 to .29 (Supp. 1964); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §§63.28.070-.920
(1961).
22. See FLA. STAT. §717.11 (1963).
23. UNIFORM Ac. §19; see FLA. STAT. §717.20 (1963).
24. UNIFORM ACr §§11, 24; see FLA. STAT. §§717.12, .25 (1963).
25. UNIFORm Aar §23; see FLA. STAT. §717.24 (1963).
26. UNIFORM Acr §25; see FLA. STAT. §717.27 (1963) (failure to report or
deliver shall be a misdemeanor in Florida).
20.
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to provide adequate legislation to insure compliance.2 7 Until this
is done debtor states that have no intangible escheat provisions will
be unable and perhaps unwilling to comply with the rule and there
will be no way for creditor states to force compliance since no interstate discovery devices are available.
Although Florida received only $111.7028 from the holding in
Texas v. New Jersey, it has been estimated that the actual total of
these abondoned intangible properties is in excess of $15 billion and
is increasing at the rate of $1 billion per year. 29 It is reasonable to
assume that any other rule presented that might have been adopted
by the Court would have favored the highly industrialized eastern
seaboard to a greater extent than the rule adopted. Because Florida
is high among the retirement states and fewer major corporations
have their principal place of business here, our creditors would seemingly outweigh our debtors. In conclusion, the rule of Texas v. New
Jersey is a practical one that realistically faced a troubled area of the
law, however the Supreme Court has moved as far as it can toward
providing a complete solution. Because it seems unlikely that all fifty
states will adopt the Uniform Act, the need is for a federal statute to
regulate and provide orderly administration among the states.
OSMOND C. HowE, JR.

27. See Note, A Federal Act To Resolve Conflicting State Claims to Abandoned Property, 1 HARV. J. ON LEG. 151 (1964).
28. Brief for Florida as Intervenor, pp. 8-9, Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S.
674 (1965).
29. Wall Street J., Jan. 22, 1961, p. 1, col. 1.
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